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The Editorial on the Research Topic
Reward Processing in Motivational and Affective Disorders
Reward prediction and valuation are central to decision making (Schultz et al., 1997; O’Doherty,
2004), and thus motivate and guide human action. Faulty reward processing can be pragmatically
viewed as compromised decision-making, reflected in making suboptimal choices. A primary
aim of this Research Topic is to provide a dimensional approach for reward processing. In
accordance with the Research Domain Criteria, a newly proposed research classification of mental
health disorders based on behavioral dimensions and neurobiological findings (Insel et al., 2010),
reward processing deficits can be of transdiagnostic importance. This prominence has been largely
influenced by the evolution of novel neuroimaging techniques, experimental cognitive psychology
findings, and the application of computational modeling in simulating human behavior. This body
of work has increased knowledge of the neural mechanisms underlying aberrant reward processing.
We maintain that construing patterns or expressions of reward processing as potential
biomarkers, or indices of psychological vulnerability, can facilitate early detection and intervention
in the clinical arena. Additionally, therapeutic approaches originating in the psychology laboratory
aimed at modifying or reversing cognitive biases or behavioral approach biases linked to aberrant
reward processes are showing promise in preventing relapse in the context of addiction (see
Gladwin et al., 2016). It is this twin promise of enhanced prediction of vulnerability or risk and
ultimately improved clinical outcomes, combined with a deeper understanding of brain functions,
that motivated us to gather together this unique series of articles linked by the common thread of
reward processing.
The Topic includes four original articles exploring reward processing in schizophrenia,
depression, addiction and in the context of stress or anxiety. These empirical contributions are
complemented by three review articles, two theoretical contributions and an opinion piece. In
tandem with laboratory findings, these more conceptual articles put emphasis on the role of the
integrity of neuromodulatory systems implicated in reward processing as well as the remarkable
insights that can be derived from the implementation of computational modeling.
Rømer Thomsen, set the scene by outlining the subcomponents of reward processing: wanting,
liking and learning. This parsing of reward processing enables a critical analysis of the concept of
anhedonia, suggesting that deficits in reward processing are not restricted to “liking” (the subjective,
pleasurable, experience of being rewarded). Other components, “wanting” and mechanisms
underlying learning about rewards, can also be disrupted and contribute to the development and
maintenance of disorders such as addiction and depression.
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Arrondo et al. demonstrated blunted reward anticipation in
people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and depression. This
attenuated striatal response to the prospect of monetary reward
correlated with depressive symptoms in the schizophrenia group,
but did not cohere with clinical symptoms of depression in
the depressed cohort. Di Lemma et al. and colleagues found
that, contrary to predictions, approach and avoidance tendencies
following positive and negatively themed videos did change in
parallel challenging the expectation that these are independent
processes. Woud et al. investigated broadly similar processes
investigating cohorts of current or former tobacco smokers. The
researchers reported no attentional or behavioral approach biases
in either current smokers, nicotine deprived smokers and ex-
smokers, thus challenging incentive theories of addiction. These
three innovative studies raise important questions for further
research, and refine experimental methods in the process.
Robinson et al. applied a stress manipulation paradigm
in order to study the effect of acute stress on two well-
established biases in decision-making, temporal discounting and
the framing effect. The researchers observed mood alterations
in response to experimentally induced stress, but no effects
on decision-making processes. Acute stress impacted on low
level “bottom–up” perceptual biases, but higher level executive
processes were unperturbed. The findings support the application
of psychotherapeutic approaches aiming to enhance cognitive
control as an apparently resilient component of therapeutic
intervention for affective disorders.
Chekroud discussed the distortions in reward sensitivity
and/or reward learning that contribute to the development of
depression. He described the implementation of the free-energy
principle, which views the brain as a “predictive machine,” aimed
at reducing surprise (i.e., free energy) by constructing congruent
cognitive models and optimizing actions. One potential clinical
application is that changing cognitive representations using
pharmacological agents or psychotherapy will be a necessarily
gradual rather than immediate process. Also on the topic of
depression, Dillon assigned a pivotal role to reward processing
in the formation of long term memories. He concluded that
impaired reward processing reflected distorted mesolimbic
dopaminergic transmission, thus impeding the transfer of
short-term memories into long-term episodic memory storage.
Consequentially, in order to recover from depression, not only
will somebody who is depressed need to overcome amemory bias
for the recall of negative events, they will also struggle to recall
positive events.
Cousijn highlighted the role of fronto-parietal and limbic
brain networks that are implicated in vulnerability to cannabis
use disorders, other substance misuse disorders and increased
risk of anxiety and depression. When these cognitive control
systems are compromised individuals are more likely to reach
out for immediately available rewards whether they are linked
to substance use or the powerful negative reinforcement that
occurs when emotional distress is alleviated by avoidance, thus
increasing the possibility of anhedonia and depression.
Moutoussis et al. differentiated between optimal decisions
delivering the best possible rewards and a conceptualization of
psychiatric disorder based on suboptimal reward processing.
In this context, rewards are milestones or surrogates to
strategic goals such as health, wellbeing and social affiliation.
The researchers emphasized the importance of considering
the patient’s autonomy by pointing out the need for the
clinician to engage in a dialog to elicit the patient’s values and
goals. Story et al. identified two factors involved in delayed
reward discounting in psychiatric disorders: the opportunity cost
that waiting for a delayed reward entails and the associated
uncertainty of reward delivery.
The theoretical insights and experimental findings presented
in this topic justify further exploration of the mechanisms
underlying the anticipation, valuation and pursuit of rewards. In
tandem with this, adapting and applying these findings in clinical
settings could, we believe, provide additional therapeutic benefit.
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